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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Katherine Taylor brought suit under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq., 
and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 
Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. S 951 et seq., alleging that her former 
employer, the Phoenixville School District, failed to provide 
her reasonable accommodations for her mental illness. The 
District Court granted summary judgment for the school 
district, reasoning that Taylor's mental illness, bipolar 
disorder, or manic depression as it is sometimes called, did 
not qualify as a disability under the ADA. Alternatively, the 
District Court held that even if Taylor did have a disability, 
the only accommodation she specifically requested, transfer 
to another position, was not possible, and consequently, 
she was not an otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability. 
 
In an opinion filed on April 5, 1999, we reversed the 
District Court's order after we concluded that Taylor's 
unmedicated condition demonstrated that she has a 
disability; we also found that she raised genuine factual 
disputes on whether the school district participated in good 
faith in the interactive process required by the ADA. When 
the school district sought rehearing, we held its petition 
until the Supreme Court announced its decisions in two 
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then-pending cases addressing whether disabilities under 
the ADA are judged with or without regard to mitigating 
measures. The Supreme Court has now decided in Sutton v. 
United Airlines, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (1999) 
and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 
2133 (1999) that whether a plaintiff has a disability under 
42 U.S.C. S 12102(2)(A) must be evaluated taking into 
account any mitigating measures the plaintiff uses. 
 
Based on these decisions, we have granted panel 
rehearing and vacated our prior opinion, which was 
reported at 174 F.3d 142. Applying the new law, we 
conclude that there are genuine factual disputes requiring 
a trial on whether Taylor's bipolar disorder substantially 
limits a major life activity while she is taking lithium. 
Because Sutton and Murphy concerned only the issue of 
when a plaintiff has a disability under the ADA, our 
previous discussion of the interactive process is unaffected; 
therefore, we have incorporated it unchanged in this 
opinion. 
 
I 
 
Before she was terminated on October 28, 1994, 
Katherine Taylor had worked for twenty years as the 
principal's secretary at the East Pikeland Elementary 
School in the Phoenixville School District. Prior to the fall 
of 1993, Taylor had not received a single disciplinary notice 
from any of the various principals she worked with over the 
years, and when formal evaluations were instituted in the 
1991-92 school year, she received high praise. 
 
Trouble began after Taylor suffered the onset of bipolar 
disorder in late August of 1993, regrettably during the first 
full week that a new principal, Christine Menzel, assumed 
her duties at East Pikeland. While Taylor was at work 
during that week, she began acting strangely, alarming 
Menzel and Linda Ferrara, the school district's 
administrative assistant for personnel. Menzel and Ferrara 
were so disturbed by Taylor's behavior that they doubted 
her capacity to leave on a train by herself and had someone 
at the school district contact her son, Mark Taylor. He soon 
drove his mother to Coastal Plain Hospital, a psychiatric 
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institution in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, where she was 
admitted as an in-patient on August 31, 1993. 
 
Hospital records indicate that Taylor had become manic 
and was increasingly agitated and psychotic. According to 
the records, she hid herself at the train station, believing 
that someone was after her, and tried to disguise herself by 
covering her head with a scarf. On the car ride from 
Pennsylvania to the hospital, she was delusional and 
announced that the car was being escorted by state 
troopers and helicopters. She also claimed that her son's 
boss was after him and that there were many people on the 
highway who were "firefighters" trying to protect her. The 
hospital report noted that she did not have any insight into 
the severity of her condition and believed she was being 
admitted due to "acute stress." The school district's own 
expert, Dr. Rieger, agreed that during Taylor's 
hospitalization, she "clearly had paranoid delusions" and 
was hyperactive and psychotic. 
 
Taylor was treated by two psychiatrists at the hospital 
who diagnosed her illness as bipolar disorder and treated 
her with lithium carbonate and an antipsychotic drug, 
Navane, when lithium alone was insufficient. Once her 
symptoms were brought under control by the combination 
of drugs, she was discharged on September 20, 1993, and 
her care was taken over by Dr. Louise Sonnenberg, a 
psychiatrist in Phoenixville, Pennsylvania. Since her 
discharge from the hospital, Taylor has continued to take 
lithium, see Dr. Sonnenberg, and receive the necessary, 
periodic blood tests.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. One widely-used text explains that: "Because lithium has an extremely 
narrow therapeutic range, blood levels of the drug must be closely 
monitored. The occurrence and intensity of side effects are, in most 
cases, directly related to plasma concentrations of lithium. . . . The 
main 
toxic effects involve the gastrointestinal tract, the kidneys, the 
thyroid, 
the cardiovascular system, the skin, and the nervous system." Robert M. 
Julien, A Primer of Drug Action, 8th ed., W.H. Freeman & Co., at 229-30 
(1998). The Physicians' Desk Reference, 53rd ed., Medical Economics 
Co., at 2750 (1999) is in agreement: "Lithium toxicity is closely related 
to serum lithium levels and can occur at doses close to therapeutic 
levels." Both authorities state that when the amount of lithium in the 
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Taylor's son stated in an affidavit that during his 
mother's leave of absence, he had numerous phone 
conversations with Ferrara in which he explained that his 
mother would be absent from work because she had been 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and required 
hospitalization. Mark Taylor also asserted in his affidavit 
that during a phone call on October 8, one week before his 
mother resumed working, he told Ferrara that due to his 
mother's bipolar disorder, she "would require 
accommodations when she returned to work." The affidavit 
adds that he provided Ferrara with the information he 
received from Taylor's doctors "including diagnosis and 
treatment information and medications." Coastal Plain 
Hospital itself sent a letter to the school district on 
September 13, 1993, identifying one of Taylor's physicians 
and providing a phone number to address any additional 
questions the school district might have. 
 
According to Taylor, Ferrara did eventually contact one of 
her treating physicians. Ferrara's own handwritten notes 
show that she attempted to obtain copies of Taylor's 
records from Coastal Plain Hospital and planned to speak 
to at least one of Taylor's doctors. The school district had 
other contact with her doctors because before Taylor was 
permitted to return to work, the school district required her 
to submit a note from Dr. Sonnenberg saying that Taylor 
was no longer disabled. Even prior to Mark Taylor's October 
8th phone call, Ferrara sent a letter to the school district's 
superintendent, stating that: 
 
       Mrs. Taylor has been released from the Coastal Plain 
       Hospital in North Carolina and her son will be picking 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
blood is near and above the therapeutic range, side effects can include 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, slight tremor, lethargy, impaired 
concentration, dizziness, slurred speech, ataxia, muscle weakness, and 
nystagmus. Julien adds that memory problems and weight gain are also 
frequent complaints with continued treatment. As plasma levels rise 
higher, toxic effects include muscle rigidity, coma, renal failure, 
cardiac 
arrhythmias, and death. Blood levels can fluctuate for a variety of 
reasons. For example, Julien notes that "when a patient lowers his or 
her salt intake or loses excessive amounts of salt (such as through 
sweating), lithium blood levels rise and intoxication may inadvertently 
follow." Id. at 228. 
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       her up this coming weekend to bring her back to 
       Pennsylvania. She will be receiving out-patient care in 
       Phoenixville through the Phoenixville Psychiatric 
       Associates. They will monitor her Blood Lithium[sic] 
       levels. It was stressed that she must maintain and 
       continue her medication. He felt, as well as the doctor, 
       that the first week should be easing her transition back 
       into the work place. 
 
App. vol. I at 80. 
 
A notation on the letter indicates that a copy was 
forwarded to Menzel. She submitted an affidavit, however, 
denying that she saw the memo and asserting that"I did 
not learn the specifics of the Plaintiff's alleged condition 
(i.e., bipolar disorder) until after reading a newspaper 
article describing her filing of the current lawsuit." App. vol. 
II at 2. Ferrara has also submitted an affidavit asserting 
that "at no time was I or anyone else at the School District 
aware of Plaintiff's alleged diagnosis of bipolar disorder or 
the details or frequency of any treatments she may have 
been receiving after returning from Coastal Plain until after 
the current lawsuit was filed." App. vol. II at 50. 
 
After Taylor provided the note from Dr. Sonnenberg, she 
resumed work on October 15, 1993 although, as Ferrara's 
letter indicated, Taylor was only authorized to work half 
days for the first week. Prior to her hospitalization, Taylor 
had received high praise for her performance. In June of 
1993, about two months before her hospitalization, the 
outgoing principal, Dr. Herron, wrote that Taylor"excels in 
all aspects" of her job, was a "credit to our school," and "a 
tribute to excellence." App. vol. I at 86. In a subsequent 
letter of recommendation, Dr. Herron again praised her 
performance without reservation: 
 
       As a secretary, Mrs. Taylor served me and the entire 
       school family exceeding[ly] well. . . . I felt comfortable in 
       leaving the building, sometimes for an extended 
       amount of time, because of Mrs. Taylor's skills. Indeed, 
       at such times, Mrs. Taylor carried on the full functions 
       of the school as if she herself was capable of running 
       the functions of the building without supervision, and, 
       indeed, in such cases, she was entirely capable of 
       doing so. 
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App. vol. I at 87. 
 
Almost immediately upon Taylor's return to work, 
Menzel, following Ferrara's advice, began documenting 
errors Taylor committed. The errors were then compiled 
into a bullet-format list; the list was presented to Taylor; 
and soon thereafter Menzel and Ferrara would call her into 
a disciplinary meeting and offer her a chance to rebut the 
charges. A representative from Taylor's union also attended 
although it is unclear to what extent the representative 
participated. 
 
Taylor's first disciplinary notice, dated November 9, 1993, 
listed errors as early as October 19, 1993, only four days 
after she returned to work and while she was still working 
part time. Eight more disciplinary notices followed, dated 
11/23/93, 12/9/93, 1/6/94, 2/1/94, 3/11/94, 4/22/94, 
9/2/94, and 10/27/94, the last arriving shortly before she 
was terminated. Over the course of the disciplinary 
meetings, Taylor disputed some charges and tried to 
explain others, but as 1994 wore on, Menzel documented 
many errors that she did not contest, and the interpersonal 
friction between Menzel and Taylor continued unabated. 
Disciplinary notices during this period list problems such 
as missed deadlines, mishandling of records, typing errors, 
interpersonal conflicts, and undelivered messages. 
 
Part of Taylor's complaint about her treatment is that 
Menzel often did not speak to her informally and in-person 
about problems as they arose. Instead, Taylor alleges that 
Menzel documented every misstep, saved letters containing 
typos, photographed her desk and trash can, as well as the 
inside of the office refrigerator, and waited to confront her 
with the evidence in the disciplinary meetings. 
 
Taylor also objects that the school district made her job 
more difficult upon her return from the hospital. First, 
during her absence, Menzel instituted a number of changes 
in the office: she introduced new office policies, created new 
forms, relocated documents, rearranged furniture, threw 
out Taylor's old filing system, and discardedfiles, including 
some in Taylor's desk. Taylor claims that these changes 
were disorienting and made it much more difficult to 
accomplish tasks she could easily perform before the 
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hospitalization. Of course, Taylor's absence coincided with 
the first weeks Menzel served as principal, and thus 
changes were inevitable and part of Menzel's prerogative as 
a new principal. The gravamen of Taylor's complaint, 
however, focuses on the abrupt, seemingly hostile manner 
in which the changes were made. 
 
Compounding Taylor's difficulties, a new computer 
system was introduced to keep track of student records and 
other data. The school district points out that plans to 
introduce the computers had been underway prior to her 
hospitalization, and according to an affidavit submitted by 
a school-district employee, Taylor had more difficulty than 
the other secretaries at a training session conducted in 
July of 1993. Taylor does not appear to dispute that the 
school district was entitled to switch to computers; rather, 
the thrust of her objection seems to be that the school 
district raised another hurdle by the manner in which the 
new system was introduced when she returned from her 
hospitalization. 
 
Taylor claims that her job was made more difficult in 
another, more straightforward way: following her return, 
her job description was changed, increasing the number of 
her job responsibilities from 23 to 42. It is not clear from 
the record when these changes were made, how substantial 
they were, or to what extent the new list simply enumerated 
in greater detail duties she already performed, but reading 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, there is 
reason to believe that the new list added significant 
responsibilities and made her return more difficult. 
 
On September 2, 1994 Taylor received a notice placing 
her on probation for 30 days and informing her that if her 
performance did not improve, she would be terminated. She 
was in fact discharged on October 28, 1994 although her 
union representative subsequently negotiated with the 
school district to allow her to "retire" and receive some 
retirement benefits. Since her termination, Taylor has 
applied at different times for unemployment benefits and 
disability benefits. 
 
II 
 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Taylor's ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
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supplemental jurisdiction over her state-law claim pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our review of a district 
court's grant of summary judgment is plenary. Olson v. 
General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951 (3d Cir. 
1996). In evaluating the school district's motion for 
summary judgment, we must determine whether there are 
any genuine disputes of material fact, and if not, then 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, we must decide whether the school district was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56; Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 
106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11 
(1986). 
 
III 
 
A. Basic statutory framework 
 
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from 
discriminating "against a qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual in 
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, 
and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(a). A 
"qualified individual with a disability" is defined by the ADA 
as a person "with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential 
functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). A"disability" is 
defined as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities 
of [an] individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12102(2). 
 
In view of the foregoing definitions, we have held that in 
order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADA, the plaintiff must show: "(1) 
he is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) 
he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions 
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of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations by 
the employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse 
employment decision as a result of discrimination." Gaul v. 
Lucent Technologies, 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996)). 
 
Discrimination under the ADA encompasses not only 
adverse actions motivated by prejudice and fear of 
disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable 
accommodations for a plaintiff's disabilities. The ADA 
specifies that an employer discriminates against a qualified 
individual with a disability when the employer does "not 
mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical 
or mental limitations of the individual unless the[employer] 
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of the 
[employer]." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 
Before turning to the first issue, whether Taylor has a 
disability under the ADA, we mention that we will only 
discuss Taylor's ADA claim because our analysis of an ADA 
claim applies equally to a PHRA claim. Kelly v. Drexel 
University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
B. Does Taylor have a disability under the ADA? 
 
According to the statutory language quoted above, Taylor 
can establish that she has a disability if she has a mental 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, 
has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as 
having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). Taylor 
argues that she can satisfy each of these standards, but 
because we conclude that she raises genuine factual 
disputes about whether her bipolar disorder substantially 
limits a major life activity, we need not reach her 
arguments on the second and third definitions of a disability.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The parties' briefing on appeal has focused heavily on the first 
standard -- does Taylor have an impairment that substantially limits a 
major life activity? What discussion there was of the second and third 
standards for having a disability did not address whether a plaintiff who 
relies exclusively on either the "regarded as" standard or the "record of 
a substantially limiting impairment" standard is legally entitled to 
reasonable accommodations. 
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No one disputes that bipolar disorder counts as a mental 
impairment under the ADA; the contested issue is whether 
Taylor's bipolar disorder substantially limits a major life 
activity. In determining whether a plaintiff's impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity, the Supreme Court 
has stressed that courts should "determine the existence of 
disabilities on a case-by-case basis." Albertsons, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999). To 
make that individualized assessment, we must begin by 
identifying the specific life activity or life activities that 
Taylor says her disorder affected and then evaluate whether 
her condition "substantially limits" those life activities. 
 
When Taylor relied upon our prior holding that 
disabilities are judged in their untreated state, she 
contended that while she was hospitalized, her bipolar 
disorder affected a number of her major life activities, such 
as the ability to think and care for herself. Following the 
decisions in Sutton and Murphy, which require courts to 
evaluate disabilities in their treated condition, Taylor 
submitted supplemental briefing that shifted the emphasis 
to her ability to think. 
 
We accept that thinking is a major life activity. We have 
previously observed that "[t]he ADA does not define `major 
life activities,' " Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105 (citation omitted), but 
despite the comparative lack of guidance in the statute, we 
conclude that it is reasonable to include thinking as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We have previously identified, without deciding, the issue of whether 
a "regarded as" plaintiff is entitled to accommodations. See Taylor v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 195-96 (3d Cir. 1999); Deane v. 
Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1998)(en banc). 
Although those cases addressed the "regarded as" standard, the "record 
of an impairment" standard may raise similar considerations. 
 
We need not resolve these difficult issues in our present decision. 
Given that we have other grounds for reversal, intervening law has 
affected the "regarded as" standard, and important issues were left 
unaddressed by the parties, we will allow the parties to pursue on 
remand whether Taylor is regarded as disabled or has a record of a 
substantially limiting impairment and, if so, whether she would be 
entitled to reasonable accommodations under either of those standards. 
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major life activity. We hardly need to point out that 
thinking is inescapably central to anyone's life. Perhaps the 
activity is rather broad, but given the difficulty of specifying 
the different constituents of thinking or otherwise 
narrowing this central activity (especially when discussing 
the effects of psychosis or its subclinical manifestations), 
we will not try to constrict Taylor's arguments about how 
her condition affects her ability to think. We think that 
most objections about the broadness of thinking as a life 
activity can be captured in the analysis of when the activity 
is substantially limited. 
 
The Supreme Court has said, "The ADA does not define 
`substantially limits,' but `substantially' suggests 
`considerable' or `specified to a large degree.' " Sutton, 119 
S.Ct. at 2150. But while substantial limitations should be 
considerable, they also should not be equated with"utter 
inabilities." Kirkingburg, 119 S.Ct. at 2168 (quoting Bragdon 
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998)). 
 
The EEOC's regulations define "substantially limits" as 
follows: "(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the 
average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) 
Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or 
duration under which an individual can perform a 
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the 
general population can perform that same major life 
activity." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations include 
the following factors for evaluating when someone is 
substantially limited in a major life activity:"(1) The nature 
and severity of the impairment; (ii) The duration or 
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) The 
permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent 
or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment." 
29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2). 
 
The Supreme Court left unresolved in Sutton what 
deference, if any, these regulations are due. The Court 
stated that even though the EEOC is charged with issuing 
regulations for the employment provisions under Title I of 
the ADA, "[n]o agency, however, has been given authority to 
issue regulations implementing the generally applicable 
provisions of the ADA, see SS 12101-12102, which fall 
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outside Titles I-V." Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2145. The Court 
concluded that it did not have to resolve the issue of 
deference because the parties in Sutton did not contest the 
validity of the regulations, including 29 C.F.R.S 1630.2(j), 
that interpret the generally applicable provisions. Id. 
Because we have previously applied 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j), 
see, e.g., Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105, we will follow it here as 
well. 
 
When Taylor had to be confined to a hospital because she 
was psychotic, increasingly agitated, and gripped by 
delusions, the limitations on her ability to think were 
severe: She suffered paranoid delusions that people were 
trying to kill her, inducing her to disguise herself at the 
train station. During the car ride to the hospital, she 
thought her son's life was in danger, believed that the 
highway patrol was escorting her, and thought the highway 
was filled with "firefighters" there to protect her. Unable to 
recognize that these beliefs were baseless, she explained at 
the time of her admission that she was there for"acute 
stress." 
 
Both the school district's expert and Taylor's treating 
physician agreed that Taylor has bipolar disorder and that 
the condition is chronic. Dr. Rieger, the school district's 
expert, added, "There is no doubt in my mind that Ms. 
Taylor experienced a biologic psychiatric illness in which 
genetic factors play a role. These illnesses can appear even 
fairly late in life regardless of life events and stressors. . ." 
App. vol. I at 157. Dr. Sonnenberg, Taylor's treating 
physician, confirmed that Taylor has an ongoing condition 
that requires her to stay on lithium,3  and according to Dr. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The District Court evidently refused to consider Dr. Sonnenberg's 
opinion because the Court said, citing Gaul v. AT&T, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 
346 (D.N.J. 1997), Taylor could not rely on the opinion of her own 
treating physician. But Gaul stated that"[i]t is well settled that 
treating 
physicians may testify as to any subject relevant to the evaluation and 
treatment of their patients." Id. at 349. At issue in Gaul was whether 
testimony by the plaintiff's treating physician satisfied the New Jersey 
Supreme Court's holding that "expert medical testimony is required to 
establish the fact of the employee's [handicap]." Id. (quoting Clowes v. 
Terminex International, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597 (1988)). Just as the 
District Court in Gaul deemed admissible the opinion of a plaintiff's 
treating physician, we hold that a plaintiff in an ADA case can rely on 
the testimony of his or her treating physician to demonstrate that the 
plaintiff has a disability. 
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Rieger's report, Taylor has continued to take 300 mgs. of 
lithium twice a day. In short, Taylor's impairment is not 
temporary,4 and it is clear that at the time of her 
hospitalization, her impairment was substantially limiting. 
But the central question, in light of Sutton and Murphy, is 
whether Taylor's continuing impairment remained a 
"disability" under the ADA by imposing substantial 
limitations even while treated. Specifically, Taylor must 
show that she was substantially limited during the year 
following her hospitalization, the time span when she says 
that she was denied reasonable accommodations. 
 
Taylor maintains that even though lithium has improved 
her condition and has reduced the risk of full-blown 
psychotic episodes, the drug has not perfectly controlled 
her symptoms, leaving her still substantially limited in her 
ability to think. She argues that Dr. Sonnenberg's notes 
indicated that she continued to suffer symptoms of her 
disorder, including paranoia. On November 9, 1994, a 
couple of months after Taylor started taking lithium, Dr. 
Sonnenberg wrote a short note to the school district, 
explaining that Taylor was temporarily unable to work. 
Taylor's claims of uncontrolled, ongoing symptoms are 
corroborated by a number of other sources as well. Lithium 
has a very narrow therapeutic range, and blood levels of the 
drug can fluctuate for a variety of reasons. See supra, at 
n.1. Throughout the 1993-94 school year following her 
hospitalization, she experienced enough difficulty that she 
saw Dr. Sonnenberg twenty-five times even though Taylor, 
who earned a secretary's salary, cares for a disabled child, 
and is divorced, had to pay the $120 fee out of pocket and 
was reimbursed only half the cost by her insurance. One 
can infer that she would not have undertaken such expense 
without experiencing serious difficulty. Taylor also points 
out that prior to her hospitalization, she had received high 
praise for her work performance, but after the onset of her 
illness, she encountered a number of problems, as the 
school district's records document. Therapeutic levels of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See, e.g., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th 
Ed., American Psychiatric Association, at 353 (1994); Frederick Goodwin 
and Kay Redfield Jamison, Manic-Depressive Illness, Oxford University 
Press, ch. 23 (1990); Julien, supra, n.1 at 232. 
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lithium can cause a number of side effects. See supra, at 
n.1. Some of these effects, like the nausea Taylor 
complained of, may bear indirectly on the ability to think, 
while other side effects, such as impaired concentration 
and memory problems, bear directly on thinking. Taylor's 
problems at work may have been related to these drug side 
effects, and the Supreme Court has noted that drug side 
effects can be important in evaluating whether someone is 
disabled. Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2147. 
 
Given our prior holding in Matczak v. Frankford Candy & 
Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997), Taylor not 
surprisingly focused on her untreated condition when she 
accumulated evidence to demonstrate that she had a 
disability, and as a consequence, the record is not as fully 
developed as it might be. Nevertheless, we believe that she 
has presented sufficient evidence to require a trial on 
whether she continued to be substantially limited even 
while receiving treatment. 
 
Although Taylor clearly was disabled at the time she was 
hospitalized, she need not prove that she continued to 
experience symptoms of that magnitude: paranoia and 
distorted mood can have a "substantial" or"considerable" 
impact on Taylor's thinking well before they force 
hospitalization. Substantial limitations need not rise to the 
level of the "utter inabilities" Taylor experienced at the time 
of her hospitalization. When we consider the nature and 
severity of the impairment, its duration, and its expected 
long-term impact, see 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(j)(2), we find 
evidence that Taylor has had to contend with a serious, 
very much ongoing condition. Following the initial severe 
episode, she again had to leave work just a few months 
later; she sought treatment twenty-five times throughout 
the year; and every day throughout this period she took 
medication requiring careful monitoring. That she may not 
have experienced problems every day does not defeat her 
claim. Chronic, episodic conditions can easily limit how well 
a person performs an activity as compared to the rest of the 
population: repeated flare-ups of poor health can have a 
cumulative weight that wears down a person's resolve and 
continually breaks apart longer-term projects. 
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The school district argues vehemently that Taylor is not 
disabled and points to the report of its expert. After 
conducting an office visit with Taylor on June 24, 1997, Dr. 
Rieger concluded: "When I examined Ms. Taylor[,] she had 
a normal mental state. Her chronic biological psychiatric 
illness was obviously well controlled by medication. If she 
continues to take her medications as instructed[,] she will 
be able to work. She is now not at all disabled from a 
psychiatric point of view." App. vol. I at 159. 
 
We do not think Dr. Rieger's report is sufficient to grant 
summary judgment in the school district's favor. Taylor has 
presented evidence that she is disabled, and on summary 
judgment we read the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party and resolve genuine factual 
disputes in favor of the nonmoving party. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11 (1986). Dr. Rieger's report also 
has a number of problems that could lead a reasonable jury 
to reject it. The passage quoted above, for example, says 
that Taylor is not presently, on June 24, 1997, exhibiting 
the symptoms of her disorder. That statement does not 
resolve what Taylor's condition was like between the fall of 
1993 and the fall of 1994. Taylor may have gained better 
control over her condition by the time roughly four years 
had passed from the onset of her disorder. 
 
Another shortcoming of Dr. Rieger's report is that it is 
based on one office visit. A jury could question whether he 
relied on too slender a base of experience observing Taylor's 
condition. It is true that the doctor was able to review a 
number of documents, including Taylor's disciplinary 
reports from the school district and the reports from 
Coastal Plain Hospital, but these reports may not have 
given a very full or accurate picture of the range of 
symptoms Taylor experienced while on medication. 
 
We think it is significant that Taylor had difficulty 
recognizing and expressing the symptoms of her condition. 
Not only did she believe at the time of her hospitalization 
that she was merely suffering from "acute stress," but this 
difficulty seemed to continue. Dr. Rieger's own report 
reveals this problem. When he asked Taylor to describe the 
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events leading up to her hospitalization, she related that 
Ferrara told her "she needed some rest." App. vol. I at 150. 
 
       Upon my question Ms. Taylor revealed what prompted 
       this recommendation: "I was telling [Ferrara] about a 
       person who was employed by the district. I remarked 
       that the person was dead -- strike that -- was injured. 
       I had passed an ambulance. That person was on my 
       mind. It was a strange remark that wasn't true." Upon 
       my question Ms. Taylor agreed that in retrospect what 
       she just told me sounded like a delusion. She 
       immediately continued her story: "I had planned to 
       take time off. I had Amtrak tickets to see my mother in 
       Rocky Mount, North Carolina. I didn't get there. The 
       train was canceled because of a hurricane. My son 
       took me there by car. My brother made arrangements 
       for me to go to the Coastal Plains Hospital." Upon my 
       question she confirmed that the entire trip was 
       planned so that she could go to a psychiatric hospital 
       near her relatives. She could not recall what specific 
       delusions she voiced upon entering the hospital. She 
       recalled that she gave the doctors lots of information, 
       that she was "very talkative" although very tired. 
       [Elsewhere the report quotes Taylor as saying"some 
       nights I got only 3 to 4 hours of sleep."] Upon my 
       question she admitted that she may have been 
       euphoric. 
 
Id. One would expect a plaintiff to inflate the severity of her 
condition when talking to opposing counsel's expert. Taylor 
instead made her hospitalization sound like a simple trip to 
visit her mother and had obvious difficulty conveying the 
extent of her illness. We should not insist that all plaintiffs 
with bipolar disorder must have the self-awareness and 
expressive powers of a Robert Lowell (who had the illness) 
before we allow that their condition is substantially 
limiting. 
 
After reviewing the school district's records, Dr. Rieger 
did express the opinion that Taylor's "misconduct was 
solely due to her basic personality," and "[w]hatever 
subjective difficulties she experienced during her last year 
of employment were not due to her mental illness but due 
to her peculiar personality traits. . . ." Id. at 158 and 156. In 
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a similar vein, he asserted that people with bipolar disorder 
can "fulfill all their work duties to the full satisfaction of 
their superiors without engaging in misconduct and 
without requiring any accommodations." Id. at 159. 
 
A reasonable jury could question the doctor's conclusion 
that all of Taylor's problems at work were due solely to her 
"peculiar personality traits" and not to her mental illness. 
Taylor had performed very well at work prior to the onset of 
her illness; only after she became psychotic and was 
hospitalized did problems appear. Thus, a reasonable jury 
could find it surprising that the peculiar personality traits 
only manifested themselves after she became ill. It also is 
not clear that the doctor was in a position to judge when 
Taylor had engaged in "misconduct" at work; a reasonable 
jury could question any uncritical reliance on the school 
district's own reports about Taylor. 
 
Another reason that the school district denies that Taylor 
is disabled is that before the school district allowed Taylor 
to return to her job, she was required to submit a note from 
her doctor saying that she was able to work. Dr. 
Sonnenberg responded to this requirement by sending a 
one sentence message saying that Taylor "is able to return 
to work and is not disabled." Supp. App. at 1. The school 
district argues that since the doctor said that Taylor was 
"not disabled," Taylor must have been symptom free. 
 
But the doctor's remark appears to be simply another 
way of saying that Taylor was capable of working. It is 
hardly conclusive proof that Taylor was not substantially 
limited. That Dr. Sonnenberg used "disabled" as the 
equivalent of "able to work" is supported by her earlier note 
in November that said Taylor "is temporarily disabled and 
not able to work at this time." App. vol. I at 77. While the 
doctor's use of the term "disabled" is not unusual, 
especially in the context of disability insurance, it is not an 
accurate definition for the purposes of the ADA. To say that 
no one is disabled under the ADA unless the person is 
unable to work would render all the provisions in the ADA 
governing reasonable accommodations at work entirely 
empty of meaning. If there has ever been a legal term of art, 
"disabled" certainly qualifies. And the Supreme Court 
recently rejected glib estoppel arguments that turn on the 
 
                                18 
  
different meanings carried by the term "disability." 
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., ___ U.S. 
___, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999). 
 
C. Reasonable accommodations 
 
Having concluded that there are genuine factual disputes 
about whether Taylor has a disability under 42 U.S.C. 
S 12102(2)(A), we must consider whether the school district 
failed to provide reasonable accommodations. On this issue, 
we find that the District Court applied the wrong legal 
standards and that under the correct standard, disputes of 
material fact remain, requiring remand. 
 
As stated above, an employer commits unlawful 
discrimination under the ADA if the employer does"not 
mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical 
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
[the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation 
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the 
business of [the employer]." 42 U.S.C. S 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 
In evaluating whether a plaintiff is a "qualified individual 
with a disability," we have held that a plaintiff must 
"satisf[y] the prerequisites for the position, such as 
possessing the appropriate educational background, 
employment experience, skills, licenses, etc." and, the 
plaintiff must be able to "perform the essential functions of 
the position held or desired, with or without reasonable 
accommodations." Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 
Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.2(m) at 351). Because Taylor held her 
position as secretary to the principal for many years, 
receiving high praise, there is no serious dispute that she 
satisfies the prerequisites for the position. The critical issue 
is whether Taylor could, with reasonable accommodations, 
perform the essential functions of her job following her 
return from her hospitalization. 
 
The Interactive Process 
 
The ADA's regulations state that: "To determine the 
appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary 
for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process 
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with the [employee] in need of accommodation. This process 
should identify the precise limitations resulting from the 
disability and the potential reasonable accommodations 
that could overcome those limitations." 29 C.F.R. 
S 1630.2(o)(3). Similarly, the EEOC's interpretive guidelines 
provide that: "Once a qualified individual with a disability 
has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, 
the employer must make a reasonable effort to determine 
the appropriate accommodation. The appropriate 
reasonable accommodation is best determined through a 
flexible, interactive process that involves both the employer 
and the [employee] with a disability." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, 
App. S 1630.9 at 359. 
 
We have previously recognized both this regulation and 
the EEOC's interpretive guideline and applied them to a 
claim brought under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 
S 701, et seq. Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 419-20 (3d 
Cir. 1997); see also Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 
F.3d 138, 149 (3d Cir. 1998)(en banc).5  Based on the 
regulation and interpretive guidelines, we held in Mengine 
that "both parties have a duty to assist in the search for 
appropriate reasonable accommodation and to act in good 
faith." Id. We noted that other circuits have taken this view. 
See, e.g., Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 
F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996)("A party that obstructs or 
delays the interactive process is not acting in good faith. A 
party that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or 
response, may also be acting in bad faith."); Taylor v. 
Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 
1996)(The "employee's initial request for an 
accommodation... triggers the employer's obligation to 
participate in the interactive process..."). 
 
In Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Community Schools , 100 
F.3d 1281 (7th Cir. 1996) an employee diagnosed with 
paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar disorder sought to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. While Mengine involved a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
regulation and interpretive guidelines applied in the case were from the 
ADA. Furthermore, according to 42 U.S.C. S 12201(a), the ADA should 
not be construed to apply a lesser standard than the Rehabilitation Act. 
See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 2202 (1998). 
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return from an extended disability leave to his job as a 
custodian. His employer informed him that he would be 
reassigned to the largest school operated by Fort Wayne 
Community Schools, and added that he would not receive 
any special accommodation. The employer then instructed 
the plaintiff to take a physical and report to work or else he 
would be terminated. After touring the new school with the 
custodial foreman, the plaintiff told his employer that he 
did not think he was equal to the task but said he was not 
resigning. The plaintiff subsequently failed to take the 
physical or report to work although he did have his 
psychiatrist send a letter to the employer which stated that 
due to the plaintiff's illness, it would be in the plaintiff's 
best interest to work at a less stressful school. The 
employer never responded and terminated the plaintiff. The 
Seventh Circuit, reversing summary judgment for the 
employer, concluded that there was a genuine dispute as to 
whether the employer engaged in the interactive process of 
seeking accommodations. 
 
We agree with the Seventh Circuit which held that: 
 
       An employee's request for reasonable accommodation 
       requires a great deal of communication between the 
       employee and employer... [B]oth parties bear 
       responsibility for determining what accommodation is 
       necessary... `[N]either party should be able to cause a 
       breakdown in the process for the purpose of either 
       avoiding or inflicting liability. Rather, courts should 
       look for signs of failure to participate in good faith or 
       failure by one of the parties to help the other party 
       determine what specific accommodations are 
       necessary. A party that obstructs or delays the 
       interactive process is not acting in good faith. A party 
       that fails to communicate, by way of initiation or 
       response, may also be acting in bad faith. In essence, 
       courts should attempt to isolate the cause of the 
       breakdown and then assign responsibility.'  
 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Beck, 75 F.3d at 
1135). 
 
Our analysis of the interactive process in the present 
case is divided into two steps: first, we will clarify what 
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notice must be given to the employer to trigger the 
employer's obligations under the interactive process, and 
second, we will elaborate on the employee's and the 
employer's duties once the interactive process comes into 
play. 
 
1. Notice of the disability and request for accommodation 
 
The first question we must address is who must make 
the request for accommodation and what form that request 
must take. The EEOC compliance manual provides that"a 
family member, friend, health professional, or other 
representative may request a reasonable accommodation on 
behalf of an individual with a disability."2 EEOC 
Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for Psychiatric 
Disabilities, at 20-21. Likewise, in Bultemeyer the Seventh 
Circuit allowed that an employee's psychiatrist could make 
a request for accommodations on behalf of an employee. 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286. In our case, therefore, 
Taylor's son could make the initial request for 
accommodations. 
 
The EEOC's manual further provides that "[r]equests for 
reasonable accommodations do not need to be in writing," 
2 EEOC Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for 
Psychiatric Disabilities, at 21, and "[t]o request 
accommodation, an individual may use `plain English' and 
need not mention the ADA or use the phrase `reasonable 
accommodation.' " Id. at 19. The Seventh Circuit said that 
"properly participating in the interactive process means 
that an employer cannot expect an employee to read its 
mind and know that he or she must specifically say`I want 
reasonable accommodation,' particularly when the 
employee has a mental illness." Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 
1286. 
 
The EEOC's manual makes clear, however, that while the 
notice does not have to be in writing, be made by the 
employee, or formally invoke the magic words "reasonable 
accommodation," the notice nonetheless must make clear 
that the employee wants assistance for his or her disability. 
In other words, the employer must know of both the 
disability and the employee's desire for accommodations for 
that disability. 
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These rules are consistent with the statute which says 
that the employer must make reasonable accommodations 
to an employee's "known" disability. 42 U.S.C. 
S 12112(b)(5)(A). What matters under the ADA are not 
formalisms about the manner of the request, but whether 
the employee or a representative for the employee provides 
the employer with enough information that, under the 
circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know of 
both the disability and desire for an accommodation. 
 
What information the employee's initial notice must 
include depends on what the employer knows. In Taylor v. 
Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 1996), 
an employee whose job performance had fallen off 
mentioned to his employer that he was diagnosed with 
bipolar disorder. Nothing the employee had done suggested 
the nature of his illness. When the employer, who said he 
did not know about the illness, asked the employee if he 
was okay, the employee responded that he was. The 
employee never offered further information about his 
disorder and, even more significantly, could not confirm 
that he ever explicitly asked for an accommodation or help 
of any sort. Under these circumstances, the employee has 
not given sufficient notice to trigger the employer's duty to 
engage in the interactive process. Cf. Crandall v. Paralyzed 
Veterans of America, 146 F.3d 894 (D.C. Cir. 
1998)(Employee with bipolar disorder could not state a 
claim under the Rehabilitation Act when he never told his 
employer of his mental illness and never requested 
accommodations.). Employers cannot assume employees 
are disabled and need accommodations. 
 
Our case differs markedly. It is undisputed that Taylor 
became psychotic at work, that the school district knew she 
was hospitalized immediately thereafter, and that Coastal 
Plain Hospital contacted the school district by letter about 
Taylor's hospitalization and provided a phone number to 
answer questions. It is also undisputed that Ferrara wrote 
a note saying she planned to contact Taylor's doctors and 
that she wrote a letter to the superintendent, stating that 
"Phoenixville Psychiatric Associates... will monitor [Taylor's] 
Blood Lithium [sic] levels. It was stressed that she must 
maintain and continue her medication." The school district 
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also does not deny that it required Taylor to submit a note 
from Dr. Sonnenberg, further demonstrating that the school 
district knew how to get information from Taylor when it 
deemed it necessary. 
 
Based on this evidence, the school district had more than 
enough information to put it on notice that Taylor might 
have a disability, and therefore, in order to trigger the 
school district's obligation to participate in the interactive 
process, Taylor or her representative only needed to request 
accommodation. In light of the undisputed background 
information putting the school district on notice that Taylor 
had recently developed a serious disability, we think it 
would be especially inappropriate to insist that Taylor's son 
must have specifically invoked the ADA or used the words 
"reasonable accommodation" when he requested 
accommodations. Under the circumstances, it hardly 
should have come as a surprise that Taylor would want 
some accommodations, particularly as the successive 
disciplinary meetings began to mount for an employee who 
had previously performed very well. We would add that the 
school district had ample time to seek legal advice on its 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodations. 
Regardless, Taylor's son has submitted an affidavit saying 
that not only did he provide diagnostic and treatment 
information to the school district, he also asked for 
"accommodations" for his mother. 
 
Menzel's affidavit asserts that she did not "learn the 
specifics" of Taylor's disorder until after this litigation was 
started. Ferrara's affidavit states, "To my knowledge, at no 
time was I or anyone else at the School District aware of 
Plaintiff's alleged diagnosis of bipolar disorder or the details 
or frequency of any treatments she may have been receiving 
after returning from Coastal Plain until after the current 
lawsuit was filed." 
 
We want to make clear that the school district's duty to 
participate in the interactive process is triggered if Taylor 
notified either Menzel who was Taylor's supervisor and East 
Pikeland's principal, or Ferrara, the school district's 
administrative assistant for personnel. Thus, if Taylor's son 
requested accommodations from Ferrara, then the school 
district would have a duty to participate in the interactive 
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process regardless of how much Menzel knew about 
Taylor's disorder. 
 
We would add that to trigger the school district's duty to 
participate in the interactive process, it is not essential that 
Ferrara or Taylor knew the specific name of Taylor's 
condition although Taylor's son has created a factual 
dispute on this issue by saying that he provided Ferrara 
with diagnostic and treatment information. Suffice it to say 
that there is no genuine dispute that the school district was 
aware that Taylor exhibited serious psychiatric problems 
and those problems were severe enough to require her to be 
hospitalized for roughly three weeks. Following Taylor's 
discharge from the hospital, the school district knew that 
Phoenixville Psychiatric Associates monitored the lithium 
Taylor was taking and that Taylor continued to see a 
psychiatrist. Taylor also provided the school district with a 
number of avenues for obtaining further information from 
her doctors, avenues that the school district used. If there 
was any further information that the school district felt it 
needed to justify an accommodation, it was incumbent on 
the school district to ask for it. As the Seventh Circuit has 
said, "The employer has to meet the employee half-way." 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285. To raise the bar for 
triggering the interactive process any further would 
essentially nullify the process. 
 
Once the employer knows of the disability and the 
employee's desire for accommodations, it makes sense to 
place the burden on the employer to request additional 
information that the employer believes it needs. Disabled 
employees, especially those with psychiatric disabilities, 
may have good reasons for not wanting to reveal 
unnecessarily every detail of their medical records because 
much of the information may be irrelevant to identifying 
and justifying accommodations, could be embarrassing, 
and might actually exacerbate workplace prejudice. An 
employer does not need to know the intimate details of a 
bipolar employee's marital life, for example, in order to 
identify or justify an accommodation such as a temporary 
transfer to a less demanding position. 
 
Another reason for placing some burden on the employer 
is that, as the Seventh Circuit recognized in Bultemeyer, an 
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employee with a mental illness may have difficulty 
effectively relaying medical information about his or her 
condition, particularly when the symptoms are flaring and 
reasonable accommodations are needed. Id. See also Criado 
v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 444 (1st Cir. 1998)(When an 
employer terminated an employee with a mental illness due 
to an alleged miscommunication over a leave of absence, a 
jury could find that the employer failed to live up to its 
responsibility to help find accommodations.). It is worth 
noting that Taylor's hospital records specifically stated that 
at the time of her hospitalization, she "lacked insight" into 
her condition and believed her only problem was"acute 
stress." 
 
2. Application of the interactive process following adequate 
notice 
 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Taylor, 
we believe that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on 
the evidence presented thus far, that the school district did 
not meet its burden under the interactive process. Taylor's 
version of the case can be stated succinctly as follows: After 
Menzel and Ferrara watched Taylor become manic and 
require hospitalization, the two decided that Menzel should 
begin documenting Taylor's every error within days of her 
return, despite the fact that Taylor's son requested 
accommodations, informed them about Taylor's condition, 
and provided them with the means to obtain more 
information if needed. Notwithstanding Taylor's previous 
twenty years of strong performance and the school district's 
clear notice of Taylor's disability and desire for 
accommodations, the school district offered no 
accommodations or assistance in finding them, made 
Taylor's job more difficult, and simply sat back and 
continued to document her failures. A reasonable jury 
could conclude that the school district did not engage in an 
interactive process of seeking accommodations and is 
responsible for the breakdown in the process. 
 
The school district emphasizes that the only 
accommodation Taylor specifically requested was transfer 
to another position, which Taylor later conceded was not 
feasible. We do not think that it is fatal to Taylor's claim 
that her son did not request a specific accommodation or 
 
                                26 
  
that Taylor's request in March of 1994 was for an 
accommodation that she admitted was not possible. The 
interactive process, as its name implies, requires the 
employer to take some initiative. In Bultemeyer, the court 
explained, "If the note [from the psychiatrist requesting 
accommodation] was too ambiguous and [the employer] did 
not know what Bultemeyer wanted, [the employer] easily 
could have called [the psychiatrist] for a clarification." 
Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285. The interactive process 
would have little meaning if it was interpreted to allow 
employers, in the face of a request for accommodation, 
simply to sit back passively, offer nothing, and then, in 
post-termination litigation, try to knock down every specific 
accommodation as too burdensome. That's not the 
proactive process intended: it does not help avoid litigation 
by bringing the parties to a negotiated settlement, 6 and it 
unfairly exploits the employee's comparative lack of 
information about what accommodations the employer 
might allow. In addition, in some cases courts may be 
better positioned to judge whether the employer met with 
the employee in good faith than to judge how burdensome 
a particular accommodation really is. 
 
The ADA's regulations make clear that the purpose of the 
interactive process is to determine the appropriate 
accommodations: "This process should identify the precise 
limitations resulting from the disability and the potential 
reasonable accommodations that could overcome those 
limitations." 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(o)(3). Therefore, it would 
make little sense to insist that the employee must have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In Deane we emphasized the value of the interactive process for 
avoiding litigation: "we take this opportunity to observe that this 
protracted (and very much ongoing) litigation would likely have been 
unnecessary had the parties taken seriously the precepts announced in 
our opinion in Mengine." Deane 142 F.3d at 149 (citation omitted). We 
would add that the interactive process can be thought of as a less 
formal, less costly form of mediation. See 67 U.S.L.W. 2255 (noting the 
value of mediated settlement in ADA cases). Mediated settlements, the 
article explains, are cheaper than litigation, can help preserve 
confidentiality, allow the employee to stay on the job, and avoid 
monetary damages for an employer's initially hostile responses to 
requests for accommodations. The interactive process achieves these 
same goals even more effectively. 
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arrived at the end product of the interactive process before 
the employer has a duty to participate in that process. The 
EEOC's interpretive guidelines squarely place some of the 
burden on the employer by stating that "the employer must 
make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate 
accommodation." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.9 at 359. 
 
As we explained in Mengine, the process must be 
interactive because each party holds information the other 
does not have or cannot easily obtain. We noted that 
"employers will not always know what kind of work the 
worker with the disability can do, and conversely, the 
worker may not be aware of the range of available 
employment opportunities, especially in a large company. 
Thus, the interactive process may often lead to the 
identification of a suitable position." Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
420. More specifically, we explained that while an employee 
who wants a transfer to another position ultimately has the 
burden of showing that he or she can perform the essential 
functions of an open position, the employee does not have 
the burden of identifying open positions without the 
employer's assistance. "In many cases, an employee will not 
have the ability or resources to identify a vacant position 
absent participation by the employer." Mengine, 114 F.3d 
420.7 Taylor's concession that she knew of no other open 
positions, therefore, should not necessarily be the end of 
the matter if the school district made no effort to help 
investigate. 
 
When transfer is not sought, as was presumably the case 
when Taylor's son first requested accommodations, the 
employer likewise will often hold more information than the 
employee about what adjustments are feasible in the 
employee's current position. The Seventh Circuit pointed 
out in Bultemeyer that: "When Bultemeyer worked at North 
Side High School, a simple adjustment in his duties was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Our opinion in Gaul v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 
1998) should be distinguished because there the employee's proposed 
accommodation, a transfer whenever he decided he was stressed, was 
unreasonable as a matter of law. If an employee insists on a single 
accommodation that is unreasonable as a matter of law, then the 
employee will be at fault for the breakdown in the interactive process. 
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enough of an accommodation to enable him to work there. 
But this time, we do not know what might have happened, 
because [the employer] was unwilling to engage in the 
interactive process and accommodation him." Bultemeyer, 
100 F.3d at 1285. 
 
In short, an employer who has received proper notice 
cannot escape its duty to engage in the interactive process 
simply because the employee did not come forward with a 
reasonable accommodation that would prevail in litigation. 
Participation is the obligation of both parties, however, so 
an employer cannot be faulted if after conferring with the 
employee to find possible accommodations, the employee 
then fails to supply information that the employer needs or 
does not answer the employer's request for more detailed 
proposals. And while a specific request may not always be 
necessary to initiate the process, it certainly helps bolster 
the employee's claim that the employer knew that the 
employee wanted accommodations. 
 
The interactive process does not dictate that any 
particular concession must be made by the employer; nor 
does the process remove the employee's burden of showing 
that a particular accommodation rejected by the employer 
would have made the employee qualified to perform the 
job's essential functions. See Walton v. Mental Health 
Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 168 F.3d 661, 
670 (3d Cir. 1999). All the interactive process requires is 
that employers make a good-faith effort to seek 
accommodations. 
 
Employers can show their good faith in a number of 
ways, such as taking steps like the following: meet with the 
employee who requests an accommodation, request 
information about the condition and what limitations the 
employee has, ask the employee what he or she specifically 
wants, show some sign of having considered employee's 
request, and offer and discuss available alternatives when 
the request is too burdensome. These steps are consistent 
with the recommendations in the EEOC's interpretive 
guideline. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. S 1630.9 at 359-61. 
We do not think this process is especially burdensome. As 
we found in Mengine, the Postal Service engaged in good 
faith in the interactive process when it exchanged a number 
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of letters with an employee in an effort to identify a vacant 
position for reassignment and sent the employee multiple 
job descriptions of vacant positions. Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
421.8 
 
The school district can be understood as arguing 
implicitly that it did not have to participate in the 
interactive process because there was no feasible 
accommodation that would have made Taylor capable of 
performing the essential functions of her job. In Mengine we 
stated that "if reasonable accommodation is impossible, 
nothing more than communication of this fact is required. 
Nonetheless, if an employer fails to engage in the interactive 
process, it may not discover a way in which the employee's 
disability could have been reasonably accommodated, 
thereby risking violation of the Rehabilitation Act." Mengine, 
114 F.3d at 420-21. We explained that whether an 
employer's duty to participate in the interactive process has 
been discharged will often be a matter of "timing": i.e., the 
employer will almost always have to participate in the 
interactive process to some extent before it will be clear that 
it is impossible to find an accommodation that would allow 
the employee to perform the essential functions of a job. 
 
Put differently, because employers have a duty to help 
the disabled employee devise accommodations, an employer 
who acts in bad faith in the interactive process will be liable 
if the jury can reasonably conclude that the employee 
would have been able to perform the job with 
accommodations. In making that determination, the jury is 
entitled to bear in mind that had the employer participated 
in good faith, there may have been other, unmentioned 
possible accommodations. On the other hand, as we 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Employers may find it useful to take advantage of the Job 
Accommodation Network although we do not in any way suggest that 
employers are obliged to make use of this service. The EEOC compliance 
manual explains that: "The Job Accommodation Network (JAN) provides 
advice free-of-charge to employers and employees contemplating 
reasonable accommodation. JAN is a service of the President's 
Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities which, in turn, is 
funded by the U.S. Department of Labor. JAN can be reached at 1-800- 
ADA-WORK." EEOC Compliance Manual, Enforcement Guidance for 
Psychiatric Disabilities, at 23 n.56. 
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explained in Mengine, "The ADA, as far as we are aware, is 
not intended to punish employers for behaving callously if, 
in fact, no accommodation for the employee's disability 
could reasonably have been made." Mengine, 114 F.3d at 
420 (quoting Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285 
(11th Cir. 1997)). 
 
When an employee has evidence that the employer did 
not act in good faith in the interactive process, however, we 
will not readily decide on summary judgment that 
accommodation was not possible and the employer's bad 
faith could have no effect. To assume that accommodation 
would fail regardless of the employer's bad faith would 
effectively eliminate the requirement that employers must 
participate in the interactive process. An employer who 
acted in bad faith would be in essentially the same, if not 
better, position than one who participated; that is, both 
employers would be arguing that the employee failed to find 
an accommodation making him or her able to perform the 
essential function of the job. The less the employer 
participated, the easier this would become, and as a result, 
the requirement that employers participate in the 
interactive process would be toothless. Thus, where there is 
a genuine dispute about whether the employer acted in 
good faith, summary judgment will typically be precluded. 
Cf. Hendrick-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 
1998)(Refusing to grant an employer summary judgment 
because it may not have participated in good faith in 
finding accommodations); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 
149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998)(Refusing to grant an employer 
summary judgment because disputes of fact remained 
about which party caused the breakdown in the interactive 
process).9 When the disability involved is one that is heavily 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The Ninth Circuit has expressed disagreement with our decision in 
Mengine and concluded that employers are not obliged to participate in 
the interactive process. See Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 753 
(9th Cir. 1998). The majority in Barnett worried that an employer could 
be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process even 
though 
the employee was successfully accommodated. We believe that where an 
employer has successfully made reasonable accommodations, a court 
can conclude as a matter of law that the employer did not act in bad 
faith. The Barnett majority also objected that it was not clear when an 
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stigmatized in our society - as is true when the employee is 
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to a mental 
institution - courts should be especially wary on summary 
judgment of underestimating how well an employee might 
perform with accommodations or how much the employer's 
bad faith may have hindered the process of finding 
accommodations. 
 
In Taylor's case we believe that there are genuine 
disputes about the school district's good faith participation 
in the interactive process, and assuming the school district 
did act in bad faith, nothing the school district points to 
demonstrates that it would be impossible to accommodate 
Taylor. Prior to her hospitalization, Taylor performed her 
job effectively for nearly two decades. But after becoming 
disabled and seeking accommodations, she has presented 
evidence that the school district made no response to her 
request and instead increased the difficulty of her job. 
Given the evidence Taylor presents of bad faith on the 
school district's part, we will not decide on summary 
judgment that it would have been fruitless for the school 
district to make some modest and fairly obvious efforts to 
accommodate. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
employer would incur process liability. Bad faith can, of course, take 
many different forms, just as negligence can, precluding easy statement 
of a general rule about when bad faith has occurred. However, we believe 
that jurors should be able to distinguish between stonewalling and 
assisting an employee in finding accommodations. The fact that there 
may be some hard cases is hardly unique in law. The Barnett majority's 
last objection was that 29 C.F.R. S 1630(o)(3) only states that it "may be 
necessary" for the employer to engage in an interactive process. But the 
EEOC's interpretive guidelines state that once an employee requests 
accommodations, the employer "must make a reasonable effort to 
determine the appropriate accommodation." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. 
S 1630.9 at 359. The guidelines continue that in some instances the 
interactive process may not be necessary because it is clear to both 
parties involved what accommodation will work. For example, the 
guidelines explain that an employee in a wheelchair may want her desk 
elevated with blocks so that her wheelchair will slide under. No 
interactive process will be needed here. Id. at 360. The regulation uses 
the phrase "may be necessary," in other words, because sometimes the 
necessary accommodation is obvious. We have also recognized that the 
process is not necessary in cases where accommodation is impossible. 
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In particular, the school district could have increased 
Taylor's job responsibilities more slowly, given more time to 
introduce the computer, or communicated less by formal, 
written reprimands. The EEOC compliance manual for 
psychiatric disorders provides that some adjustments in 
supervisory methods can qualify as legitimate 
accommodations.10 The ADA itself specifically provides that 
reasonable accommodations can include "job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. 
S 12111(9)(B). 
 
The fact that Taylor's potential accommodations are 
modest should not encourage us to dismiss Taylor's claim 
on summary judgment on the theory that they would be 
useless; that would have the bizarre implication that the 
more demanding a plaintiff's accommodations were, the 
more likely the plaintiff is to survive summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs who wish to participate in good faith in the 
interactive process are more likely to have scaled back their 
demands and asked for modest accommodations. More 
importantly, we think it is worth remembering that 
sometimes comparatively modest accommodations can reap 
large returns in how well a disabled employee performs. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. The EEOC compliance manual states that: "Supervisors play a 
central role in achieving effective reasonable accommodations for their 
employees. In some circumstances, supervisors may be able to adjust 
their methods as a reasonable accommodation by, for example, 
communicating assignments, instructions, or training by the medium 
that is most effective for a particular individual (e.g., in writing, in 
conversation, or by electronic mail)." 2 EEOC Compliance Manual, 
Enforcement Guidance for Psychiatric Disabilities, at 26. However, the 
manual continues that "[r]easonable accommodation... does not require 
lowering standards or removing essential functions of the job." Id. at 26 
n.62. We would hasten to add that a disabled employee is not entitled to 
a supervisor ideally suited to his or her needs. We held in Gaul, for 
instance, that an employee is not entitled to transfer whenever the 
employee deems that his co-workers are causing him inordinate stress. 
134 F.3d at 579. 
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We want to reiterate the limits of the interactive process. 
We are not holding that an employer who has made a good 
faith effort to accommodate must be saddled with a 
secretary who consistently makes typos and fails to deliver 
messages. Nor do we hold that an employer cannot 
introduce a new computer system or switch an employee to 
a less forgiving supervisor. What we do hold is that an 
employer, having received adequate notice of an employee's 
disability and desire for accommodations, cannot fail to 
engage the employee in the interactive process offinding 
accommodations, increase the disabled employee's job 
responsibilities, and then simply document the employee's 
failures. 
 
To show that an employer failed to participate in the 
interactive process, a disabled employee must demonstrate: 
1) the employer knew about the employee's disability; 2) the 
employee requested accommodations or assistance for his 
or her disability; 3) the employer did not make a good faith 
effort to assist the employee in seeking accommodations; 
and 4) the employee could have been reasonably 
accommodated but for the employer's lack of good faith. 
Mengine, 114 F.3d at 420; Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285; 
Taylor, 93 F.3d at 165. 
 
We believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Taylor requested accommodations, that the school district 
made no effort to help Taylor find accommodations and was 
responsible for the breakdown in the process, and that 
there were accommodations that the school district could 
have provided that would have made Taylor able to perform 
the essential functions of her job. If a jury concludes that 
the school district was not responsible for the breakdown in 
the interactive process, Taylor must demonstrate that a 
specific, reasonable accommodation would have allowed her 
to perform the essential functions of her job. 
 
We have viewed the evidence in the light most favorable 
to Taylor, as we must on summary judgment. The school 
district is, of course, free to argue at trial that it did not 
receive notice of Taylor's request for accommodation, that it 
tried to assist Taylor in seeking accommodations, or, 
assuming the school district was responsible for the 
breakdown in the process, that no accommodation would 
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have allowed Taylor to perform the essential functions of 
her job. And as we discussed in an earlier section above, 
the school district can also contest whether Taylor is 
disabled while on medication.11 
 
IV 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the March 20, 
1998 grant of summary judgment by the District Court and 
remand the case for further proceedings. By a separate 
order we have granted panel rehearing and vacated our 
prior opinion, which was reported at 174 F.3d 142. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The District Court treated Taylor's complaint as possibly raising a 
disparate-treatment claim. Because Taylor represents on appeal that she 
did not intend to raise such a claim, we need not reach the issue. 
 
                                35 
